Transcendency in every form is an immanent existential characteristic, constituted within the ego. Every imaginable sense, every imaginable being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being. The attempt to conceive the universe of true being as something lying outside the universe of possible consciousness, possible knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical. They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an outside is precisely—nonsense. But even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere of possible insight.

The fact that this [transcendental] dimension [of consciousness] remained hidden through the ages, the fact that, even after it made itself felt, it never aroused a habitual and consistent theoretical interest, can (and will) be explained by displaying a peculiar antagonism between the entry into this dimension and the preoccupations involved in all the interests which make up the naturally normal human world-life. … This schema for a possible clarification of the problem of objective science reminds us of Helmholtz’ well-known image of the plane-beings, who have no idea of the dimension of depth, in which their plane-world is a mere projection. Everything of which men—the scientists and all the others—can become conscious in their natural world-life (experiencing, knowing, practically planning, acting) as a field of external objects—as ends, means, processes of action, and final results related to these objects—and on the other hand, also, in self-reflection, as the spiritual life which functions thereby—all this remains on the “plane,” which is, though unnoticed, nevertheless only a plane within an infinitely richer [transcendental] dimension of depth. … Of course the power of historical prejudices also plays a constant role here, especially of those which, coming from the origin of the modem positive sciences, dominate us all. It is of the very essence of such prejudices, drilled into the souls even of children, that they are concealed in their immediate effects. The abstract general will to be without prejudice changes nothing about them.

The I is not something for itself, just as what is foreign to the I is not something separate from it, and between the two there is no space in which to turn; rather the I and what is foreign to it are inseparable.

Phenomenology investigates not merely how different types of objects are meant, but also whether the reality of these objects is mind-dependent or not. In its exploration of the phenomena, transcendental phenomenology cannot permit itself to remain neutral or indifferent regarding the relation between phenomena and reality. By having to take a stand on that relationship, phenomenology by necessity has metaphysical implications. To that extent, Husserl’s transcendental idealism must be appreciated as an attempt to offer a philosophical account of reality. But what exactly does it amount to? … The strong metaphysical interpretation of the correlation makes Husserl into a metaphysical idealist. Consciousness is taken to be the ‘ontological ground for the existence of the world’ (Sebold 2014: 185), where this is understood such that ‘consciousness creates the world’ (p. 186), i.e. where constitution is taken to amount to production (p. 186). The weak metaphysical reading, by contrast, argues that the existence of appearing objects is correlated with and dependent upon subjectivity (p. 190).

— Dan Zahavi

Basically there is no psychology that could remain psychology. Once the method of disclosing intentionality has been found, then, “consistent with the matter itself,” the analytic way from the pregiven unities to the truly constituting depths of intentional life and thus to the transcendental dimension will be further pursued. Psychology must flow into transcendental philosophy. In spite of this there always exists a difference between psychology and phenomenology, even after traversing the way from psychology to transcendental philosophy. Psychology is not a “mere preliminary stage” of phenomenology, caught in a reflection on its first approach: it is that as a stage of the way to phenomenology. But when it has traversed this way, when it has “flowed out,” even then there is a difference between the two.

— Eugen Fink

This actually intuited, actually experienced and experienceable world, in which practically our whole life takes place, remains unchanged as what it is, in its own essential structure and its own concrete causal style, whatever we may do with or without techniques. Thus it is also not changed by the fact that we invent a particular technique, the geometrical and Galilean technique which is called physics. What do we actually accomplish through this technique? Nothing but prediction extended to infinity.

Einstein's revolution only affected the formulas through which idealized and naively objectified nature is interpreted.

The epoché and the [transcendental] reduction are precisely Husserl’s terms for the reflective move that is needed in order to attain the stance of transcendental philosophy. Despite the disagreements they might have with the details of Husserl’s program, both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are fully committed to this reflective move.

— Dan Zahavi

In order to understand Husserl’s final position it is […] not sufficient simply to operate with the subjectivity-world dyad. Intersubjectivity must also be taken into regard as the third indispensable element. As we have already seen, Husserl takes self and world-constitution to go hand in hand, but he would also claim that the world- and self-constitution takes place intersubjectively.

— Dan Zahavi